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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we show how to use the novel extended strand space method to verify Kerberos V. First, we 
formally model novel semantical features in Kerberos V such as timestamps and protocol mixture in this new 
framework. Second, we apply unsolicited authentication test to prove its secrecy and authentication goals of 
Kerberos V. Our formalization and proof in this case study have been mechanized using Isabelle/HOL. 
 
Keywords: Strand Space, Kerberos V, Theorem Proving, Verification, Isabelle/HOL 
1. Introduction 
 
The first version of Kerberos protocol was developed in 
the mid eighties as part of project Athena at MIT [1]. 
Over twenty years, different versions of Kerberos 
protocols have evolved. Kerberos V (Figure 1 and 
Figure 2) is the latest version released by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) [2]. It is a password- 
based system for authentication and authorization over 
local area networks. It is designed with the following 
aims: once a client authenticates himself to a network 
machine, the process of obtaining authorization to access 
another network service should be completely trans- 
parent to him. Namely, the client only needs enter his 
password once during the authentication phase. 
As we introduced in the previous paper [3], there are 
two novel semantic features in Kerberos V protocol. First, 
it uses timestamps to prevent replay attacks, so this 
deficiency of the strand space theory makes it difficult to 
analyze these protocols. Second, it is divided into three 
causally related multiple phases: authentication, 
authorization, and service protocol phases. One phase 
may be used to retrieve a ticket from a key distribution 
center, while a second phase is used to present the ticket 
to a security-aware server. To make matters more 
complex, Kerbeors uses timestamps to guarantee the 
recency of these tickets, that is, such tickets are only 
valid for an interval, and multiple sub-protocol sessions 
can start in parallel by the same agent using the same 
ticket if the ticket does not expire. Little work has been 
done to formalize both the timestamps and protocol 
mixture in a semantic framework. 
The aim of this paper is practical. We hope to apply 
the extended theory in [3] to the analysis of Kerberos V 
protocol. Kerberos V is appropriate as our case study 
because it covers both timestamps and protocol mixture 
semantical features. 
Structure of the Paper: Section 2 briefly introduces 
the overview of Kerberos V. Section 3 presents the 
formalization of Kerberos V. Sections 4 and 5 prove its 
secrecy and authentication goals. We discuss related 
work and conclude the paper in Section 6. 
 
2. An Overview of Kerberos V 
 
The protocol’s layout and its message exchanging are 
presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2 separately. In the 
infrastructure of the Kerberos V protocol, there is a 
unique authentication server, and some (not necessarily 
only one) ticket granting servers. The latter assumption is 
different from that in [4], where only a unique ticket 
granting server exists. 
*This is a revised and extended version of the homonymous paper ap-
pearing in the Proceedings the Eighth International Conference on Paral-
lel and Distributed Computing, Applications and Technologies (PDCAT
2007, IEEE Computer Society). The main modifications have been made
on the presentation of the technical material, with the purpose of having
full details. The first author is supported by grants (No.60496321, 
60421001) from National Natural Science Foundation of China.
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Figure 1. The layout of Kerberos V. 
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Figure 2. Kerberos V: message exchanging. 
 
In order to access some network service, the client 
needs to communicate with two trusted servers Kas  and 
Tgs. Kas is an authentication server (or the key distribution 
center) and it provides keys for communication between 
clients and ticket granting servers. Tgs  is a ticket 
granting server and it provides keys for communication 
between clients and application servers. The full protocol 
has three phases each consisting of two messages 
between the client and one of the servers in turn. 
Messages 2 and 4 are different from those in Kerberos 
IV [1,4] in that nested encryption has been cancelled. 
Later we will show that this change does not affect goals 
of the protocol. 
Detailed explanation about Kerberos V is delayed to 
Section 2, where the protocol is formalized in strand 
space model with our extensions. Here we only give an 
overview of the general principles to guarantee recency, 
secrecy and authentication in the design of Kerberos V. 
For recency, 
• A regular sender should attach a timestamp to 
indicate the time when the message is issued; usually 
such a message is of the form  , , Kt  , where t  is 
the time, K  may be either a session key or long-term 
key. 
• When a regular receiver the message  , , Kt   
first he need be ensured of K ’s secrecy to guarantee 
that the message is not froged by the penetrator. Second 
he check the recency of the message by comparing the 
timestamp t  with the reception time. More formally, if 
the receiving node is n , then )(ntime  should be no 
later than ( )cracktime K t , meaning that this message 
cannot be cracked at ( )time n , which in turn indicates 
that the message  , , Kt   is recent.  
For an encrypted message  Kh , the secrecy of a 
part of the plain message h  also comes from both the 
secrecy of K  and the recency of the message  Kh  
itself. That is to say, when a regular receives  Kh  at 
time t , it must be ensured that the aforementioned two 
conditions must be guaranteed until t . From this, we 
can see that recency and secrecy are closely related with 
each other in a timed protocol framework. 
Unsolicited tests are the main mechanism to guarantee 
authentication. Because a guarantee of the existence of a 
regular node can be drawn from an unsolicited test, a 
regular agent uses unsolicited test to authenticate its 
regular protocol participant in Kerberos V. 
Now let us briefly review the main theoretical results 
in [3], which will be used in this work. For interesting 
readers, refer to [3] for preliminary definitions. 
If an agent is not a penetrator then his shared key 
cannot be penetrated, which is formalized as follows: 
Axiom 1 If ABad , then KAK .  
Lemma 1 is the main technique used to reason about 
authentication guarantee of a node n  which is an 
unsolicited test for an encrypted term of the form  Kh  
(e.g., the tickets  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T ,  , authKA t , 
and so on). That is to say, regular agents can use an 
unsolicited test with other properties of the protocol to 
guarantee that the agent who originates the term  Kh  
should be an intended regular agent. 
Lemma 1 (Unsolicited authentication test)   is a 
given bundle. Let n  be an unsolicited test for  Kh . 
Then there exists a positive regular node m  in   
such that nm   and   )(mtermh K  and   )( 'K mtermh   
for any node 'm  such that mm'  .  
Let a  be an atomic message that uniquely originates 
at some node n , m  be a positive penetrator node in a 
bundle   such that and  .mterma  Suppose M is a 
test suite for a  w.r.t. m  in the bundle  . A strand’s 
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receiving nodes get messages which are all in  ,Msynth  
but a new message, which is not in  Msynth , is sent in 
the strand, then the strand must be regular because a 
penetrator strand can not create such a term. 
Lemma 2 Let m  be a positive node in a bundle ,  
a  be an atomic message that uniquely originates at a 
regular node n , M  be a message set such that  ,,,,, nmaMsuite  and    'term m synth M  for any 
node such that ,'m m  and     ,term m synth M  
then m  is regular .   
We will illustrate these general principles in detail in 
the next sections when we formalize the semantics and 
prove secrecy properties of Kerberos V. 
 
3. Formalizing Kerberos V 
 
To model the time for a penetrator to break a message 
encrypted by a long-term shared key or a session key, we 
define two constants imeshrKcrackt  and ktimesessionKcr . 
The crack time of any regular agent’s long-term shared 
key is the constant shrKcracktime,  
Axiom 2 ( ) = shrKcracktimeAcracktime K ,  for any regular 
agent A  in Kerberos V.  
The crack time of any session key originated by an 
authentication server is the constant sessionKcrktime. 
Axiom 3 ( ) = sessionKcrktimecracktime authK , for any 
session key authK originated by Kas . 
The trace tr  specifications of the regular strands of 
Kerberos V (see Figure 2) are defined as predicates:1 
 
1) Part I (Authentication Phase)  
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where TGSsTgs .  
In the first phase, when Kas  issues the second 
message 
    , , , , , , , ATgsa a KKA Tgs authK T A Tgs authK T , 
authK  is the session key that will be used for the client 
A  to communicate with a ticket grant server Tgs , 
Kas  attaches aT  with the message to indicate when 
this message is sent; if A  receives this message at time 
1t , A  will check the condition 1 shrKcracktimeat T   
to ensure the recency of this message. At the end of this 
phase, A  obtains a ticket authTicket  and the session 
key authK  to communicate with Tgs . 
 
2) Part II (Authorization Phase)  
 
• Ag-II ,,,,,,,[ 2 STservKBauthTicketauthKAi  
],, 32 ttservTicket  iff  21101 .,,,, iittTTgsi a   
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where TGSsTgs  and imeshrKcrackt3  aTt  and 
ktime.sessionKcr3  STt  
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where TGSs,Tgs  TGSs,B 1 sessionKcrktimet    
shrKcracktimeaT  .  
In the second phase, the situation is more complex. 
Both Tgs  and A  need to check whether their received 
messages are recent by the same mechanism. Furthermore, 
Tgs  also need ensure a side condition that  
1 sessionKcrktime shrKcracktimeat T    
to guarantee that the application server B  only receives 
a recent service ticket. Informally speaking, this condition 
means that Tgs  can guarantee any authK  that he 
receives can only be compromised later than servK  
which is associated with the authK . We will comment 
this side condition in analysis in the third phase. At the 
end of this phase, A  obtains a ticket servTicket  and 
the session key servK  to communicate with B . 
1For simplicity, we assume any trace of a regular agent always respects 
the time order in Kerberos V protocol, and we do not include this side
condition in the trace specifications. 
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3) Part III (Service Phase)  
 
• Ag-III 3 4 5[ , , , , , ]i A servK servTicket t t  iff 
1 0 1 2 2 3, , , , , , , , , , ,a Si Tgs authK T t t i authTicket B T t t . 
 3tr i =
   
  
4 4
5 4
, , , , ,
, ,
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t t
      
 
Ag-I 1 0 1[ , , , , , , , ]ai A Tgs authK T authTicket t t   
Ag-II 2[ , , , , , , Si A authK authTicket B servK T , 
2 3 1 2 2 3, , ]servTicket t t i i i i    
where TgsTGSs , 5 shrKcracktimeat T   and 
5 sessionKcrktime.St T   
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where 0 sessionKcrktimeSt T  .  
In the last phase, it is subtle for the application server 
B  to check the recency of the message 
    4, , , , ,S servKKBA B servK T A T . From the ticket 
 , , , S KBA B servK T , B  knows that Tgs  must have 
issued     4, , , , , , , ,S SK authKBA B servK T A B T servK T  
at time ST . The potential compromise of servK  is 
from the message  , , , S authKA B servK T . A penetrator 
can either directly break  , , , S authKA B servK T  to 
obtain servK , or have authK  first then decrypt the 
message  , , , S authKA B servK T  to obtain servK . Since 
authK  is also a session key which is originated by 
Kas  in an earlier time than sT , the guarantee for the 
confidentiality of authK  is of extreme importance. The 
corresponding ticket  , , ,
Tgs
a K
A Tgs authK T  is not 
available for B , B  cannot know the creation time of 
authK . So B  cannot directly check whether authK  
has been compromised. Fortunately, if Tgs can guarantee 
that any authK  which it receives will be compromised 
later than servK , associated with the authK , then it is 
enough for B  to check 0 sessionKcrktimeSt T   to 
ensure that the authK  has not been compromised. At 
the end of this stage, A  and B  authenticate each 
other, and A  can access the service provided by B . 
The authentication server Kas must obey the following 
principles to generate a session key authK : 
• authK  must never be known initially to a 
penetrator, i.e., KauthK ; 
• authK  must be uniquely originated; 
• authK  is a symmetric key; 
• authK  must not be the same as an agent’s long- 
term shared key.  
We summarize these principles as the following 
axiom: 
Axiom 4 For any authentication server strand as  
such that 0 1[ , , , , , ]as A Tgs authK t tAS , we have 
KauthK , authK  uniquely originates in ( ,1)as , 
1=authK authK  , and BauthK K  for any agent B .  
A ticket grant server creates the session key servK  
by three principles, which are similar to those which the 
authentication server obeys to create the session key 
authK . 
Axiom 5 For any ticket grant server strand tgs  such 
that 0[ , , , , , , , ,atgs A Tgs authK servK B T TTGS  0 1, ]t t , 
KservK , servK  uniquely originates in ( ,1)tgs , 
1=servK servK  , and BservK K  for any agent B .  
In the following two subsections, we verify the 
secrecy and authentication properties of Kerberos V. We 
use similar ways for representing these security 
properties as in [5]. However, we may need formulate 
secrecy properties with temporal restrictions when we 
discuss them in a timed framework. A value v  is secret 
for a protocol if for every bundle   of the protocol the 
penetrator cannot receive v  in cleartext until some time 
t ; that is, there is no node n  in   such that 
( ) =term n v  and ( )time n t . For Kerberos V, we 
mainly discuss the secrecy of a long-term key of a 
regular agent, and ,authK  servK  issued by servers. 
Authentication properties are specified as usual: for a 
participant B  (e.g. acting as a responder), for a certain 
vector of parameters x , if each time principal B  
completes a run of the protocol as a responder using x  
supposedly with A , then there is a run of the protocol 
with A  acting as an initiator using x  supposedly with 
B. And this is formalized as follows: there is a responder 
strand Resp  ( x ) and the i -th node of the strand is in a 
bundle  , then there is an initiator strand Init ( x ) and 
some j -th node of the initiator strand is in  . 
In order to prove the secrecy of a long-term key AK , 
we only need use the well-founded induction principle 
on bundles. But the knowledge closure property on 
penetrators is needed when we prove the secrecy of some 
session key authK  or servK . For instance, in order to 
prove the secrecy of authK , we construct a set  
    , , , , , , ,Adf a aK KTgsM A Tgs authK T A Tgs authK T  
 | .t authK t   
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We will show that for any node m  in a Kerberos 
bundle ,  if )(mtermauthK  and ( )time m    
shrKcracktime,aT   
then ( )term m  must be in ( ).synth M  Intuitively, this 
fact holds because both the penetrator and regular strands 
can only emit a message which is in ( )synth M . The 
penetrator can not decrypt or crack the messages  
 , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  and  , , , a KTgsA Tgs authK T  
until time .shrKcracktime,aT  so it can only synthesize 
any messages which is in ( );synth M  except a unique 
authentication server strand, any other regular strand can 
not emit any message which has authK  as a subterm 
until that time. But for the authentication server strand,  
he can only emit  
   1 1, , , , , , ,K KTgs AA Tgs authK t A Tgs authK t     
which is still in ( ).synth M  Our formal proof is by 
contradiction. If not so, by the well-founded induction 
principle on  , we have a minimal element m  such 
that )(mtermauthK  and ( ) ( ).term m synth M  By 
the knowledge closure property, we can exclude the 
cases when m  is in a penetrator strand. By case 
analysis on the form of the trace of regular strands, we 
can also exclude the case when m  is in a regular strand. 
Thus, a contradiction is concluded. 
In the following two sections, we give the detailed 
proof on the secrecy and authentication properties to 
show how to apply the proof techniques aforementioned. 
Note that we also have formalized all the proofs in 
Isabelle/HOL, and the proof scripts can be obtained at 
[6]. The paper proof here can be viewed as a text account 
of the mechanical proof scripts at [6]. 
 
4. Proving Secrecy Goals 
 
In Kerberos V, a long-term key of a regular agent is 
never sent in the network, so it cannot be compromised. 
Let   be a bundle of Kerberos V. For any node in the 
bundle, the long-term key of a regular agent cannot be a 
part of the term of the node. In order to prove this lemma, 
we only need the well-founded induction principle on 
bundles. 
Lemma 3 Let n . If BadA , then AKnterm )( .  
Proof. Let  
)}(|{= xtermKxxP Adf   
We show that P  is empty by contradiction. If there 
is a node Pn'  , then by the well-foundedness of a 
bundle, there exists a node m  such that m  is minimal 
in P . Namely, m , )(mtermK A , and for all  
'm , if mm'   then )( 'A mtermK  . 
We prove that the sign of m  is positive. If =)(msign , 
then by upward-closed property of a bundle there must 
be another node ''m  in the bundle   such that 
=)( ''msign  and mm ''  . This contradicts with the 
minimality of m . Then m  is either in a regular strand 
or in a penetrator strand. 
• CASE 1: m  is in a regular strand. 
There are six cases. Here we only analyze the cases 
when m  is in an authentication server strand as AS 
],,,,,[ 10 ttauthKTgsAas  or m  is in a client strand i Ag-II ,[i ,A ,authK ,authTicket ,B ,servK ,ST  
,servTicket ,2t ]3t . The other cases are either straightforward 
or can be analyzed in a similarly. 
If m  is in an authentication server strand such that 
as AS ,[as ,A ,Tgs ,authK ,0t ].1t  By inspection on 
the trace form of the strand, we have ,1)(= asm , 
,1)(astermK A , and 
   1 1( ,1) = , , , , , , ,K KTgs Aterm as A Tgs authK t A Tgs authK t    , 
then 
 1, , ,A KTgsK A Tgs authK t or  1, , ,A KAK A Tgs authK t . 
In both cases, we can conclude that .= authKK A  But 
this contradicts with Axiom 4. If m  is in a client strand 
such that [ ,i i Ag II ,A ,authK ,authTicket ,B  
,servK ,ST ,servTicket ], 32 tt . By inspection on the trace 
form of the client strand, we have ,0)(= im , 
,0)(itermK A , and 
  2( ,0) = , , , ,authKterm i authTicket A t B  
then .authTicketK A  But by the definition of the client 
strand, there exists some client strand 11 suchthatii    
i and Ag-I ,[ 1i ,A ,Tgs ,authK ,aT ,authTicket ]., 10 tt  
From the definition of the strand , we have 
,1).( 1itermauthTicket  From this and AK    
,authTicket  we have (1) ,1).( 1itermK A  From 1i    
,i  we have (2) ,1)( 1i    ,0).(i  From (1) and (2), we 
can conclude that m  is not minimal in P .  This 
contradicts with the minimality of m . 
• CASE 2: m  is in a penetrator strand p . 
Here we only analyze the cases when p  is either 
KK  (key strand) or hgC ,  (concatenation). Other cases 
are either straightforward or can be analyzed in a similar 
way. 
- p  is KK . We have ,0)(= pm  and KK A . 
Then KKK A = . This contradicts with Axiom 1. 
- p  is hgC , . We have ,2)(= pm
'  and  hgK A , . 
By the definition of  , we have gK A , or hK A . If 
gK A , then ,0)( ptermK A . This contradicts with the 
minimality of m . The case when hK A  can be 
analyzed similarly. 
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If an authentication ticket  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  or  , , ,
Tgs
a K
A Tgs authK T  occurs as a subterm of a node in 
 , A  is not compromised, and Tgs  is a ticket 
granting server, then it can be guaranteed that there must 
be an authentication server strand as  in which  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  and  , , ,
Tgs
a K
A Tgs authK T  originate 
at time aT . Therefore, aT  is the earliest time when  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  and  , , ,
Tgs
a K
A Tgs authK T  occur in 
 . With the specification of the origination of the key 
authK  by Kas  (formulated by Axiom 4), we also are 
ensured that aT  is the earliest time when authK  
occurs in  . The minimal property of aT  will be used 
in the proof of Lemma 5. 
Lemma 4 Let n , BadA , and TGSsTgs . If  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  or  , , , ( )
A
a K
A Tgs authK T term n , 
then there exists an authentication server strand as  
such that ,,,[ TgsAasAS ],, 0 aTtauthK  for some 0t , ,1)(as , and )(ntimeTa  .  
Proof.  
Here we only prove the case  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  
  .nterm  The other case can be proved in a similar 
way. First we prove that (1) n  is an unsolicited test for 
the term  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  We only need prove 
that AK  must be regular w.r.t. n . By Lemma 3, there 
is no node m  in   such that   ,= AKmterm  so AK  
must be regular w.r.t. n . 
From (1), by Lemma 1, there exists a positive regular 
node m in   such that nm   and  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  
)(mterm  and  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  )( 'mterm  for 
any node 'm  such that mm'  . 
From nm   and   is a bundle, we can easily 
conclude )()( ntimemtime   and .m  
Now we prove that m  must be in an authentication 
server strand. From the fact that m  is regular, then we 
have six cases, here we select two cases when m  is in 
an authentication server strand as  such that AS as[ , 
'A , 'Tgs , 'authK , 0t , 1]t  or in an ticket granting server 
strand tgs  such that tgs[TGS , 'A ,Tg , 'authK , servK , 
'B , 'aT , 0T , 0t , ].1t  
• m  is in an authentication server strand as  such 
that AS as[ , 'A , 'Tgs , 'authK , 0t , ].1t  By inspection on 
the form of the strand,  ,1= asm  because m  is 
positive. Obviously 
   1 1
( )
, , , , , , ,
Tgs A
' ' ' ' ' '
K K
term m
A Tgs authK t A Tgs authK t
 

   
 
By , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T   ),(mterm  we have either (2) 
 , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T   1, , ,
Tgs
' ' '
K
A Tgs authK t

 or (3) 
 , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T   1, , ,
A
' ' '
K
A Tgs authK t

. From (2), 
we have 'AA =  and 'TgsTgs =  and 'authKauthK =  
and 1= tTa , so AS ].,,,,,[ 0 aTtauthKTgsAas  Case (3) 
can be prove similarly. 
• m  is in an ticket granting server strand such that 
TGS ].,,,,,,,,,[ 100 ttTTBservKauthKTgAtgs
'
a
'''  By 
inspection on the form of the strand,  ,1= tgsm  
because m  is a positive node. Obviously 
    1 1( ) , , , , , , , .
B
' ' ' '
K authK
term m A B servK t A B servK t
 
  
From  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  ),(mterm  we have 
either (2)  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T   1, , ,
B
' '
K
A B servK t

 
or (3)  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T   1, , ,' ' authKA B servK t  . 
From (2), we can prove that ,= 'BTgs  then by the 
assumption ,TGSsTgs  we have .TGSs'B  But by 
the definition of the ticket granting server, we have 
'B TGSs. Therefore a contradiction is obtained. Case 
(3) can be proved similarly. 
Once the authentication tickets  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  
or  , , ,
Tgs
a K
A Tgs authK T  are created by the authentication 
server Kas  at aT , then the session key authK  will 
be not compromised until the time imeshrKcracktaT . 
Lemma 5 Let n , BadA , and TGSsTgs . If 
 , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  or 
 , , , ( )
Tgs
a K
A Tgs authK T term n , 
then for any node m  such that ( ) atime m T   
shrKcracktime , authKmterm )( .  
Proof. First we define two sets. 
 
   tauthKtTauthKTgsA
TauthKTgsA
M
TgsKa
AKa
df 





 |,,,
,,,,
 
= { . ( ) shrKcracktimedf aP m m time m T      
 ( ) }term m synth M . 
We show that for any node m  such that 
imeshrKcrackt)(  aTmtime ,  Msynthmterm )( . In 
order to prove this, we only need show P  is empty. We 
prove the assertion by contradiction. If P  is not 
empty ,  then by the well-foundedness of a bundle, (1) 
there exists a positive node m  such that m ,  ,)( Msynthmterm   imeshrKcrackt)(  aTmtime , 
and for all 'm , if mm'   then ( )term m    synth M . 
First from the fact that  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  or  , , , ( )
Tgs
a K
A Tgs authK T term n  by the Lemma 4, then 
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there exists an authentication server strand as  such that 
,,,[ TgsAasAS ],, 0 aTtauthK  for some 0t , ,1)(as , 
and )(ntimeTa  . From the definition of AS  and 
Axiom 4 ,  we have (2) authK  uniquely originates at 
,1)(as  and .=,1)( aTastime  
Next we prove that (3) ,Msuite( ,authK ,m ,1),(as  
 ). Here we need show both  , , ,
A
a K
A Tgs authK T  and  , , ,
Tgs
a K
A Tgs authK T  are components in  . From 
A    Bad  and Tgs    TGSs , by Lemma 3, we 
have that neither AK  nor TgsK  is compromised, and 
they are symmetry, therefore ),,( 1 mKregular A  and 
),,( 1 mKregular Tgs ; furthermore from )(mtime    aT    
,imeshrKcrackt  and by Axiom 2, )( AKcracktime  =  
ime,shrKcrackt  with (2), we have )(mtime    ,1)(astime  
,)( AKcracktime  similarly we have )(mtime  ,1)(astime  
( ),Tgscracktime K  so (3) is proved .  
From (1), we have for any 'm  such that mm'  , 
term  Msynthm' )( . With (2)(3), by Lemma 2, we 
have m  must be in a regular strand i , then there exist 
six cases. Here we analyze the cases when 
AS i[ , 'A , 'Tgs , 'authK , 't0 , ]1t , other cases are more 
simpler .  If m  is in an authentication server strand 
AS i[ , 'A , 'Tgs , 'authK , 't0 , ].1t  By inspection on the 
form of the strand,  ,1= im  because m  is positive. 
Obviously 
   1 1
( )
, , , , , , ,
Tgs A
' ' ' ' ' '
K K
term m
A Tgs authK t A Tgs authK t
 

    .
 
Obviously authK    term ),(m  otherwise term )(m  
  .M  Therefore  1, , ,
A
' ' '
K
authK A Tgs authK t

  or 
 1, , ,
Tgs
' ' '
K
authK A Tgs authK t

  then .'authK authK  
From the definition of Axiom 4, we have authK  
uniquely originates from the strand i . Combining with 
(2), we have ias = , then 'AA = , 'TgsTgs = , aTt =1 , 
so 
   
( )
, , , , , , ,
( )
a aK KTgs A
term m
A Tgs authK T A Tgs authK T
synth M
    

 
This contradicts with the fact ).()( Msynthmterm   
Therefore for any node m  such that )(mtime  
imeshrKcracktaT ,  Msynthmterm )( . Next we 
only need prove that  MsynthauthK  . We prove by 
contradiction, if  ,MsynthauthK   by the rule inversion 
of definition of synth , we have ,MauthK   this 
contradicts with the definition of M . 
In order to prove the conclusion of Lemma 5, we need 
the conclusion of Lemma 4, which ensures us that a 
penetrator cannot crack the term  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T  
(or  , , , a KTgsA Tgs authK T ) to obtain .authK  Because 
the earliest time when authK  occurs in   is aT  and 
authK  can only occur in  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T  (or  , , , a KTgsA Tgs authK T ) the penetrator cannot crack 
such a term until imeshrKcracktaT , and what he can 
only do is to synthesize some term from M . Therefore, 
authK  must be safe until that time. Furthermore, the 
intermediate result of this proof tells us that )(mterm  
must be in  Msynth  for any node m  such that 
ime.shrKcrackt)(  aTmtime  
If both the tickets 
 , , , S authKA B servK T  and  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T   
occur as a part of the term of a node in  , A  and B  
are not compromised, and B  is not a ticket grant server, 
and authK  is still not compromised at the time when 
the above two tickets occur, then it can be guaranteed 
that A  must have passed the first and second phases of 
the protocol, and a ticket grant server strand tgs  must 
exist in  , where two tickets 
 , , , S KBA B servK T  and  , , , S authKA B servK T  
are issued for some session key authK . Similar to 
Lemma 4, this lemma ensures us that ST  is the earliest 
time when servK  occurs in  , and this minimal 
property is needed in the proof of Lemma 7. 
Lemma 6 Let nm, , BadA , TGSsTgs . If 
both 
 , , , ( )a KAA Tgs authK T term m , 
and 
 , , , ( )S authKA B servK T term n  
and imeshrKcrackt)(  aTntime , then there exists a 
ticket granting server strand tgs  such that ,,[ AtgsTGS  
],,,,,,, 00 Sa TtTTBservKauthKTgs for some 0T , 0t , 
,1)(tgs   and )(ntimeTS  . 
Here we only give the proof sketch of this lemma. 
First we need show that (1) n  is an unsolicited test for  , , , S authKA B servK T  in  . We need prove  .,, nauthKregular  This can be ensured by Lemma 5. 
Because ime,shrKcrackt)(  aTntime  we have 
( )'term n authK for any node 'n such that 
( ) ( ).'time n time n  From (1), we can show that there is 
a regular node 'n  such that 'n n  and 
 , , , S authKA B servK T  term )( 'n  and 
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 , , , S authKA B servK T   term )( 'm  for any node 'm  
such that '' nm  . By the case analysis on the form of 
regular strands, we can prove that 'n  must be in a ticket 
granting server strand tgs  such that [ ,tgsTGS ,A  
,Tgs ,authK  ,servK ,B ,aT 0 ,T 0 ,t ]ST  for some 0T , 
0t , 
'ntgs =,1)(  and )(= 'S ntimeT . 
Moreover, by the fact a ticket  , , , S authKA B servK T  
is originated at time ST , then the session key servK  
will not be compromised until the time  
ktimesessionKcrST . 
Because during the interval from ST  to  
ktimesessionKcrST , 
neither  , , , S authKA B servK T  will be cracked, nor the 
session key authK  can be obtained by a penetrator to 
decrypt the ticket  , , , S authKA B servK T . 
Lemma 7 Let 0m , n , BadBA, , TGSsTgs . 
If both  , , , a K AA Tgs authK T )( 0mterm  and  , , , ( )S authKA B servK T term n , 
and imeshrKcrackt)(  aTntime , then for any node m  such that ktimesessionKcr)(  STmtime , 
servKmterm )( .  
Proof. First we define: 
 
   .|,,,
,,,,
= tservKt
TservKBA
TservKBA
M
authKS
BKS
df 





 
We will show that for any node m  such that 
ktimesessionKcr)(  STmtime , term  .)( Msynthm   
We prove the assertion by contradiction. 
Let 
.{= mP df m    )(mtime  ST  ktimesessionKcr
term )(m     }.Msynth  If P  is not empty ,  then by 
the well-foundedness of a bundle, (1) there exists a 
positive node m  such that m , )(mtime    ST    ktimesessionKcr , term  ,)( Msynthm   and for all 
'm , if mm'   then term  Msynthm' )( . 
From the fact  , , , a K AA Tgs authK T  ),( 0mterm  
by Lemma 4, there exists an authentication server strand 
as  such that ,,,[ TgsAasAS ],, 0 aTtauthK  for some 0t , 
,1)(as . From the definition of AS , we know (2) 
authK  uniquely originates at ,1)(as  and 
aTastime =,1)( . 
From the fact that  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T  )( 0mterm  and  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T  ),(nterm  by Lemma 6, then there exists a ticket granting server strand tgs  
such that ,[tgsTGS ,A ,Tgs ,authK ,servK ,B ,aT  ,0T  
,0t  ]ST  for  some 0T , 0t . From the definition of 
TGS  and Axiom 5, we have (3) servK  uniquely 
originates at ,1)(tgs , ,=,1)( STtgstime  
 , , , a KTgsA Tgs authK T  term ,0),(tgs  
and imeshrKcracktktimesessionKcr  aS TT . From  , , , a KTgsA Tgs authK T  term ,0),(tgs  by Lemma 4, we can easily conclude that ,0)(tgstimeTa  , then (4) 
,1).(tgstimeTa   
Next we prove that (5) ),1),(,,,( tgsmservKMsuite . 
Here we need show both  , , , a KBA Tgs servK T  and  , , , S authKA B servK T  are components in  . From 
BadB , by Lemma 3, we have BK  are never 
compromised, similar to counterpart in Lemma 5, we can 
prove that  .,,1 mKregular B  From  
imeshrKcracktktimesessionKcr  aS TT  
and ktimesessionKcr)(  STmtime , we have (6) 
ime,shrKcrackt)(  aTmtime  with (4), we have 
)(mtime    ,1)(tgstime  ).( BKcracktime  From (6) 
and  , , , ( )a KAA Tgs authK T term m  for any node 'n  such that )( 'ntime  ),(mtime  we have 
ktimesessionKcr)(  S' Tntime , 
then )( 'ntime  eshrKcrktimaT , by Lemma 5, 
term )( 'n  ;authK  by Axiom 4, authK  is symmetry, 
therefore 1authK = ,authK  so  .,,1 mauthKregular   
From ktime,sessionKcr)(  STmtime  and by Axiom 4 
again, we have )(authKcracktime = ktime,sessionKcr  
then  STmtime )( ),(authKcracktime  with (3), we 
have )( mtime ,1)(tgstime ).(authKcracktime  
Therefore (5) is proved .  
From (1), we have for any 'm  such that mm'  , 
term )( 'm synth  M . With (2)(5), by Lemma 2, we 
have m  must be in a regular strand i , then there exists 
six cases. Here we analyze the cases when ,[iAS ,'A  
,'Tgs ,'authK ,0
't ]1t  or ,[iTGS ,
'A ,'Tgs ,'authK  
,'servK ,'B ,'aT ,0
'T ,0
't ]'ST , other cases are more 
simpler. 
If ,[iAS ,'A ,'Tgs ,'authK ,0
't ],1t  then by inspection 
on the form of the strand,  ,1= im  because m  is 
positive. Obviously  
   1 1
( )
, , , , , , ,
K 'Tgs
' ' ' ' ' '
KA
term m
A Tgs authK t A Tgs authK t

      
. 
Obviously servK  term ),(m  otherwise )(mterm  
.M  Therefore  , , ,
A
' ' '
a K
servK A Tgs authK T

  or 
 , , ,
Tgs
' ' '
a K
servK A Tgs authK T

  
then servK = .'authK  From Axiom 5, we have 
authK  uniquely originates from the strand i . 
Combining with (3), we can conclude i  is both an 
authentication server strand and a ticket granting server 
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strand, obviously this is a contradiction. 
If ],,,,,,,,,[ 00
'
S
'''
a
''''' TtTTBservKauthKTgsAiTGS , 
then by similar argument, we can prove that 'servK =  
,servK  from Axiom 5, we have servK  uniquely 
originates from i , with (3), we have i  =  tgs , we can 
prove that 
    ( ), , , , , , ,S SK authKB
term m
A B servK T A B servK T
 
then term )(m synth ( )M  this contradicts with (1). 
At last we only need prove that term )(m synth  
( )M  implies that term servKm )( , this is similar to 
counterpart in Lemma 5. 
Both Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 have the assumption that  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T  is a subterm of the node n , which can guarantee that authK  must be a session key originated 
by an authentication server strand. The assumption 
imeshrKcrackt)(  aTntime  is used to guarantee that 
authK  is still safe at )(ntime . Besides, the two terms  , , , S authKA B servK T  and  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T  are intelligible for the client A , so these two lemmas are 
secrecy properties in the view of A . 
In Lemmas 6 and 7, both  , , , S authKA B servK T  and  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T  are unintelligible for an application 
server B  because authK  and AK  cannot be known 
by B . So the two properties are not in B ’s view. B  
can only receive a message such as  , , , S KBA B servK T , 
can it be ensured that servK  is confidential when he 
receives the message  , , , S KBA B servK T ? The following 
two lemmas are about the confidential information 
inferred from the message  , , , S KBA B servK T . They 
are secrecy properties in B ’s view. 
Once a server ticket such as  , , , S KBA B servK T  occurs in a bundle, where A  and B  are not compromised, 
and B  is not a ticket granting server, then conclusions 
similar to those in Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 can be drawn. 
Lemma 8 Let n , BadBA, , and TGSsB . 
If  , , , ( )S KBA B servK T term n , then there exists a ticket grant server strand tgs  such that ,,[ AtgsTGS  
],,,,,,, 00 Sa TtTTBservKauthKTgs  for some Tgs , authK , 
aT , 0T , ,0t ,1)(tgs  and )(ntimeTS  .  
Lemma 9 Let n , BadBA, , and TGSsB . 
If  , , , ( )S KBA B servK T term n , then for any node m  such that ktimesessionKcr)(  STmtime , 
servKmterm )( .  
Here we summarize the main ideas used in the above 
proof of secrecy properties. 
• For a long-term key of a regular agent, its secrecy is 
easily inferred because it is never sent as a part of a 
message. We only need the well-founded induction 
principle on bundles to prove this. 
• But for a short session key authK  or servK , the 
cases are more complex because they are sent as a part in 
a message such as 
 , , , a KAA Tgs authK T  or  , , , S authKA B servK T . 
In kerberos V, a session key such as authK ( servK ) 
occurs as a part of a term of node n  which is of the 
form  Kh  ,  where K  can be either a long-term key 
or another short session key, and h  also contains a 
timestamp t  such as )( Sa TT , which indicates the time 
when  Kh  is .t  As mentioned before, both secrecy 
of K  and recency of  Kh  should be guaranteed. 
Secrecy of K  can be directly drawn from other lemmas 
on K . But for recency checking, firstly we need prove 
that the timestamp t  indeed indicates the time when  Kh  is originated. Lemmas 4, 6, 9 play a role in 
guaranteeing that t  is the first time when authK  
( servK ) is originated. From this and the assumption that 
cracktime)(  tntime ( K ), the recency of  Kh  can 
be proved.  
 
5. Proving Authentication Goals 
 
For convenience, we call that a strand i  uses a term  Kh  as an unsolicited test if there is a node n  is in 
the strand i  and is an unsolicited test for  Kh  in a 
bundle .  Because a guarantee of the existence of a 
regular node can be drawn from an unsolicited test, a 
regular agent uses unsolicited test to authenticate its 
regular protocol participant in Kerberos V. 
The client strand in the authentication phase receives  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T as an unsolicited test that authenti- cates the positive node of the authentication server strand. 
The intuition behind this authentication is quite straight- 
forward. By case analysis on the form of ,i  we have  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T  ( ,1),term i  combining with the assumption that A  is not compromised, by Lemma 4, 
we have  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T  can only be originated by an authentication server. For the sake of brevity, in 
the following discussion we use ],,,[ yxP   to denote 
],,,[. yxxPx ''  .   is a bundle of Kerberos V. 
Lemma 10 Let BadA . If i  is a client strand in 
the authentication phase such that Ag-I ,,,,[ authKTgsAi  
],,, 10 ttauthTicketTa  and ,1)(i , then there exists an 
authentication server strand as  such that ,,[ AasAS  
],*,, aTauthKTgs , ,1)(as .  
The ticket grant server strand uses  0, authKA T  as an 
unsolicited test to authenticate the client strand in the 
authorization phase. This guarantee is ensured from the 
secrecy of authK , which is in turn guaranteed by the 
ticket  , , , a KTgsA B authK T . By the trace specification of a ticket grant server strand, we have that  
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   0, , , , ,a K authKTgsA B authK T A T     
is received by Tgs earlier than the time  
ktimesessionKcraT , 
by Lemma 5, authK  is safe at that time. 
Lemma 11 Let BadA , TGSsTgs . If tgs  is a 
ticket grant server strand such that [ , ,tgs ATGS  
0 0 1, , , , , , , ],aTgs authK servK B T T t t  and ,0)(tgs , then 
there exists a client strand i  in the authorization phase 
such that ,0)(i  and Ag-II ],,,,,,,,,,[ 0  TauthKAi .  
Proof. By analysis on the form of tgs  strand, we 
have (1)  0, authKA T  ,0),(tgs  (2)  , , , a KTgsA B authK T   ,0)(tgsterm  and ,0)(tgstime  aT  imeshrKcrackt . 
From (2), by Lemma 5, we have that   mterm  authK  
for any m  such that  mtime    ,0)(tgstime , 
therefore ),0),(,( tgsauthKregular . With (1),  by 
Lemma 1, we have (3) there is a positive regular node 
m  such that ,0)(tgsm   and  0, authKA T  ( )term n   
and  0, authKA T  )( 'mterm  for any node 'm  such 
that .mm'   Obviously m . 
Now we need prove that m  must be in a client strand 
i  in the authorization phase. From the fact that m  is 
regular, then we have six cases, here we select two cases 
when (4) m is in a strand i such that Ag-II ,[i ,'A ,'authK  
,'authTicket ,'B ,'servK ,'ST ,
'servTicket ,2t ]3t  or (5) 
m  is in a strand i  such that [ , , ,' 'i A servKAg_III  
].,, 54 ttservTicket
'  Other cases are more simpler. 
If (4)  holds, then m  ,0= i  because m  is positive. 
From  0, ( )authKA T term n  and  
 mterm =   2, , , ,' authKauthTicket A t B  
we have either (6)  0, 'authKA T authTicket  or (7)  
   0 2, , .' 'authK authKA T A t  
If (6) holds, then by the definition of the client strand, 
there exists some client strand 1 1such thati i    i and 
Ag-I ,[ 1i ,
'A ,'Tgs ,'authK ,'aT ,
'authTicket ]., 10
'' tt  From 
the definition of the strand , we have  
 1( ,1) , , , , .' ' ' ' 'a K 'Aterm i authTicket A Tgs authK T
      
 
From this and (6),  we have (8)  0 1, ( ,1).authKA T term i  
From 1i  ,i  ,1)( 1i  ,0)(i , then (9) ,1)( 1i  ,0).(i  
But (8) and (9) contradicts with (3). If (7) holds, then 
,= 'AA  ,= 20 tT  .=
'authKauthK  So the conclusion 
is obtained. 
If (5) holds, then similar to the counterpart of the 
argument for case (4), we have either (10)  0, authKA T  
'servTicket  or (11)    0 4, , .' 'authK servKA T A t  For 
case (10), its proof is similar to that of case (6). If (11) 
holds, then (12) ,= 'AA  ,= 40 tT  .=
'servKauthK  By 
the definition of Ag_III , (13) there is a client strand 
12 , ii  such that 1i  2i  and 2i  i  and Ag-II ,,[ 2 'Ai  
,'authK ,'authTicket ,'B ,'servK ,'ST ,
'servTicket ,2t
]3t  and Ag-I ,[ 1i ,
'A ,'Tgs ,'authK ,'aT ,
'authTicket  
], 10
'' tt  for some 'Tgs  .TGSs  Obviously, 
 , , ,
A
' ' '
a K
A Tgs authK T

 1( ,1),term i   
  2, , , ( ,1),' ' ' 'S 'authKA B servK T term i  
and ime.shrKcrackt,1)( 2  'aTitime  From 1i  2i  and 
2i  i  and ,0)(i , we have ,1)( 1i  and 
,1)( 2i . From (12), and the assumption Bad,A  by 
Lemma 6, (14) there is a ticket granting server strand 
'tgs  such that [ ,'tgsTGS ,'A ,'Tgs ,'authK ,'servK  
,'B ,'aT ,0
'T ,0
''t ]'ST  for some ., 00
''' tT  But from (2), by 
Lemma 4, we have (15) there is an authentication server 
as  such that ,,,[ TgsAasAS ,authK ],0 a
' Tt  for some 
.0
't  But from (12) and Axioms 4,5, we have astgs' =  
because authK ( 'servK ) uniquely originates from a 
strand ,  obviously this is a contradiction.  
A client strand 2i  in the authorization phase receives  , , , S authKA B servK T  as an unsolicited test. Note that  , , , S authKA B servK T  is received in the second node in 
the client strand; furthermore, from the definition of 
Ag-II, we have that there exists a client strand 1i  in the 
authentication phase such that 1i  2i , and the ticket  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T  must be received at the second node of 1i ; from the definition of Ag-II,  , , , S authKA B servK T  
must have been received at an earlier time than aT  
imeshrKcrackt , then by Lemma 5, it can be guaranteed 
that authK  must be safe at the time when the client 
strand receives  , , , S authKA B servK T . 
Lemma 12 Let BadBA, . If i  is a client strand in 
the authorization phase such that Ag-II [ , , , ,ai A authK T  
auth - ,,1)(and],,,,,, 10 ittservTicketTservKBTicket S  
then there exists a client strand 0i  in the authentication 
phase, and a ticket grant server strand ,tgs  and some 
Tgs  such that ii 0  and Ag-I 0[ , , , , ,ai A Tgs authK T  
, , ]authTicket    and [ , , , , , ,tgs A Tgs authK servK BTGS  
, , , ]a sT T  , and ,1)(tgs , and TGSsB .  
The application server B  receives  4, servKA T , 
which is an unsolicited test to guarantee that the first 
received message must be from a client strand in the 
service phase. This guarantee is ensured from the secrecy 
of servK , which is in turn guaranteed by the ticket  , , , S KBA B servK T . By the trace specification of an application server strand, we have that  
    4, , , , ,S servKKBA B servK T A T  
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is received by B earlier than the time  
ktimesessionKcrST . 
By Lemma 9, servK  is safe at that time. 
Lemma 13 Let BadBA, , TGSsB . If b  is an 
application server strand such that [ , , , ,b A B servKApps  
4 0 1, , , ],ST T t t  ,0)(and b , then there are two client 
strands 2i , 3i  and some servTicket  such that 
2 3i i  and ,0)( 3i  and 2[ , ,*,*, , ,i A B servKAg_II  
, ,ST servTicket *,*]  and 3[ , , , ,i A servK servTicketAg_III  
4 ,*]T .  
The client strand in the service phase uses  4 servKT  
as an unsolicited test to authenticate the application 
server strand. This guarantee is also ensured from the 
secrecy of servK , which is in turn guaranteed by the 
ticket  , , , S authKA B servK T , and  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T . By the trace specification of an application server strand, 
we have that  4 servKT  is received by A  earlier than 
the time ktimesessionKcrST  and imeshrKcracktaT . 
By Lemma 7, servK  is safe at that time. 
Lemma 14 Let BadBA, , TGSsB . If 3i  is a 
client strand in a service phase such that 3[ ,iAgent_III  
],,,,, 4 tservTicketservKA and ,1)( 3i , and 2i  is a 
client strand in the authorization phase such that 
2[ , , , , , , , ,Si A authK authTicket B servK T servTicketAgent_II
2 3, ]t t  and 2 3i i , then there exists an application 
server strand b such that 4,,,,,[ tTservKBAb SApps , 
],,   and ,1)(b .  
Proof. By analysis on the form of strand 3i  and ,2i  
we have (1) ,1)( 3iterm =  4 servKt  and (2)  , ,A B  , authKservK Ts   ,1)( 2iterm . By unfolding the 
definition of Agent_II,  there exists a client strand 1i  
such that 1i  2i  and Ag-I ,[ 1i ,A ,Tgs ,authK ,aT  
,authTicket ,0t ]1t  and Tgs  TGSs  for some 
,Tgs ,aT ,0t .1t  Obviously, (3)  , , , a KAA Tgs authK T   ,1),( 1iterm  ,1)( 1itime  aT  imeshrKcrackt . From 
1i  2i  and 2i  ,3i  we can easily conclude that 
,1)( 1i
 ,1)( 3i  and ,1)( 2i  ,1).( 3i  With 
,1)( 3i   , we have ,1)( 2i     and ,1)( 1i   . 
With (2)(3), by Lemma 7, (4)  mterm  servK  for any 
node m  such that )(mtime   ST ktimesessionKcr . 
By the definition of Agent_III  we have (5) 
,1)( 3itime  ST  ktime.sessionKcr  From (4)(5), we 
have  mterm  servK  for any node m  such that 
)(mtime  ,1),( 3itime  therefore regular   .,1),(, 3 iservK  So ,1)( 3i  is an unsolicited test for  4 servKT  in .  By Lemma 1, (5) there is a regular 
positive node m  such that m ,1)( 3i  and  4 servKt    mterm  and  4 authKt  )( 'mterm  for any node 'm  such that 'm .m  Obviously m . By simple 
case analysis, we have that m  must be in an application 
server b  such that ,[bApps ,'A ,'B ,'servK ,'ST ,4
't  
, ],  ,1).(= bm  By the definition of Apps , 
,1)(bterm = .4 'servK
't With ,1)(4 btermt servK , we have (6) 
servKservK' =  and .= 44 tt
'  
Let 
 
   .|,,,
,,,,
= tservKt
TservKBA
TservKBA
M
authKS
BKS
df 





 
Obviously ,0)(btime ,1)(btime ,1)( 3itime  ST  
 ktimesessionKcr , by the proof of Lemma 7, we have 
,0)(bterm  ),(Msynth  i.e., 
    4, , , , ( )
B
' ' ' '
S ' servKK
A B servK T t synth M
 
  . 
By the definition of synth , we have  
 , , ,
B
' ' ' '
S 'K
A B servK T

 ),(Msynth  
then we have (7)  , , ,
B
' ' ' '
S 'K
A B servK T

 M  or (8) 
 , , ,' ' ' 'SA B servK T  ).(Msynth  If (7) holds, from (6) 
(7) and the definition of M , we have 
 , , , SA B servK T   , , ,' ' ' 'SA B servK T , 
then A = 'A  and B = 'B  and ST = .
'
ST  Therefore, 
the conclusion holds. If (8) holds, by the definition of 
synth,  we have 'servK  ),(Msynth  with (6), we have 
servK  ),(Msynth  then by the definition of synth,  
we have servK  ,M  but this contradicts with the 
definition of M . 
Roughly speaking, we need two steps to prove an 
authentication goal that if there is a regular responder 
strand Resp ( r , x ) and the k -th node of the strand is in 
a bundle  , then there is an initiator strand Init ( i , x ) 
and some j -th node of the initiator strand is in  . 
First we prove that ),( kr  is an unsolicited test for some 
encrypted term  Kh  in  , which requires the secrecy 
of K . This is can be easily proved by the secrecy results 
on keys in section 3. Therefore, we have that there exists 
some regular node m  in   by Lemma 2. Second, we 
need prove that m  indeed is the intended node ),( ji . 
In order to prove this, we need do case analysis on the 
form of the strand which m  possibly lies in. This proof 
needs unicity property of some session keys and the 
results of unsolicted tests, namely, the facts that  Kh    )(mterm  and m  is minimal. 
 
6. Conclusions and Related Work 
 
Our main aim is to extend and mechanize the strand 
space theory to analyze Kerberos V, since mechanization 
in a theorem prover not only helps us model protocols 
rigorously and specify protocol goals without any 
ambiguity, it also guarantees a formal proof. Besides the 
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essential inherence from the classic strand space method, 
our work is deeply inspired by Paulson and Bella’s work. 
We have directly used their formalization of message 
algebra, and have learned a lot about the semantics of 
timestamps and replay attacks from [4]. However, we 
model and analyze protocols in strand space theory 
rather than in Paulson's trace theory. In detail, we model 
behaviors of all the agents by strands, and mainly use the 
well-founded induction principle to prove properties. So 
in our Isabelle formalization, main efforts have been 
devoted to definitions and lemmas about strand space 
theory. e.g., we formalize strands, bundles, unique 
originality, the well-founded principle on bundles, and 
use this principle to prove important results such as 
unsolicited authentication test and regularity of keys. 
In [4], the ability of a penetrator to crack a stale en-
crypted message is modelled by the Oops rule in the 
inductive definition of a trace, and the trace definition 
depends on the protocol under study. However, in the 
strand space theory, a penetrator’s abilities are modelled 
to be independent of the protocol, that is the main reason 
why we relate a key with a crack time, and model a 
penetrator’s ability of cracking a stale encrypted message 
by a new key cracking strand. The advantage of our 
method is that modelling a penetrator’s behavior remains 
independent and results such as the unsolicited authen-
tication tests can be generalized. 
Regarding verification of the Kerberos protocols, 
Mitchell et al. [7] analyzed a simplified version of the 
protocol by model checking, and Butler et al. [8] 
analyzed the Kerberos V protocol using MSR [9]. But 
they did not include timestamps and replay attacks in 
their model, in fact the former work ignored both nonces 
and timestamps, and the latter only considered the 
implementation of the Kerberos protocol basing on 
nonce. 
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